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Holbrook: Home Field Advantage? An Analysis of Workers' Compensation Choice

HOME FIELD ADVANTAGE? AN ANALYSIS OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION CHOICE-OF-LAW AND CHOICE-OF-FORUM
PROVISIONS IN NFL CONTRACTS
Bryan Holbrook

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last three years, it seems as though the National Football
League (NFL) has spent as much time in the courtroom as it has on the
gridiron. On August 4, 2011, the NFL Players Association (NFLPA)
and NFL team owners reached an agreement on a ten-year labor deal,
thereby ending the highly publicized 130-day lockout that had been the
source of much litigation.1 Media criticism notwithstanding, the NFL
went on to have one of its most successful seasons ever, with Super
Bowl XLVI being the most viewed program in U.S. television history.2
However, while NFL players and coaches may have returned to the
field, it does not appear as though the league’s attorneys will be leaving
the courtroom anytime soon.
In addition to the lockout litigation, a number of players have recently
obtained mixed results in both state and federal courts when filing
workers’ compensation claims in jurisdictions other than those
stipulated in their contracts.3 In light of these mixed results, several
cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.4 It appears that both the NFL and NFLPA recognize the
significance of this litigation, as the introductory paragraph contained
within Article 41 of the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (NFL
 Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. Many thanks to
Professor Eric K. Combs for his assistance during the writing process, but also for his entertaining and
intellectually stimulating analyses of current sports law issues which frequently influenced this
comment’s form. Additionally, my gratitude extends to Clinton S. Morse, who has been a tremendous
mentor, motivator, and friend throughout my law school career. Of course, I also thank my family,
whose support over the last three years has been truly invaluable.
1. See generally Adam Schefter, Sources: Deal to End Lockout Reached, ESPN.COM (Jul. 25,
2011),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6797238/2011-nfl-lockout-owners-players-come-deal-allpoints-sources-say. See also NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
(2011), available at http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/General/2011_Final_
CBA_Searchable.pdf [hereinafter NFL CBA].
2. See Super Bowl Telecast Sets U.S. TV Viewership Record for Third Consecutive Year,
SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2012/02/07/
Media/NFL-Media.aspx (noting that 2012 marked the “seventh straight year that the Super Bowl has
seen a growth in viewership”).
3. See NFL Workers’ Compensation Court Cases, S PORTS BUS. DAILY (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/01/23/Labor-and-Agents/Workers-compcases.aspx.
4. Id.

731

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 11

732

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

CBA) states that “parties shall continue to discuss in good faith
appropriate reforms and revisions to the provisions of this Agreement
and the Player Contract related to workers’ compensation issues.”5
Additionally, Article 41, Section 6 of the NFL CBA states:
The parties shall retain the positions they held prior to this Agreement
with respect to all existing litigation and arbitration involving workers’
compensation issues . . . regarding offset issues or choice of law and
forum provisions contained in NFL Player Contracts, and nothing in this
6
article shall affect positions taken in any such pending litigation.

Accordingly, this Comment will analyze a number of NFL workers’
compensation cases containing choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
questions and will demonstrate that “[e]xpress agreement between
employer and employee that the statute of a named state shall apply is
ineffective either to enlarge the applicability of that state’s statute or to
diminish the applicability of the statutes of other states.”7 This
Comment will then argue that regardless of the NFL’s power, prestige,
and prosperity as the most successful sports league of all time, the
league may not rely on employment contracts or collective bargaining
agreements to supersede state policy.
Part II of this Comment provides a general overview of workers’
compensation in the United States as well as the different approaches
that have been adopted amongst the states regarding the applicability of
their respective statutes. Part III discusses Supreme Court precedent
relating to workers’ compensation. Part IV illustrates the varying
treatment that professional athletes receive from state to state. Part V
discusses federal preemption issues as well as the role and jurisdiction
of NFL arbitrators.
Part VI discusses recent NFL workers’
compensation cases and outlines the issues that are typically in dispute
in such cases, while Part VII contains an analysis of the NFL cases.
Lastly, Part VIII suggests a strategy to be utilized by the NFL and
NFLPA in an attempt to avoid excessive litigation over the choice-oflaw and choice-of-forum provisions contained in NFL player contracts.
II. BACKGROUND
Although workers’ compensation statutes vary from state to state,
there are certain basic features that are typical of most statutes.
Accordingly, this Part will begin by discussing fundamental features of
workers’ compensation.
Next, it will briefly discuss the

5. NFL CBA, supra note 1, at 176.
6. Id. at 179.
7. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 143.07[1] (2012).
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recommendations of the National Commission on State Workmen’s
Compensation Laws. Lastly, it will outline the different approaches the
courts have taken regarding whether parties may contract their way into
or around the applicable state statutes.
A. Worker’s Compensation
The idea behind workers’ compensation is that an employee who
suffers a “personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment” should be automatically entitled to certain benefits as
compensation for such injury.8 Accordingly, negligence or contributory
fault by either the employee or the employer does not reduce or enlarge
the employee’s entitlement to compensation.9 However, workers’
compensation coverage is not unlimited. Rather, it is available only to
persons having the status of “employee,” and thereby excludes
independent contractors and other similarly situated individuals.10
Additionally, by agreeing to accept workers’ compensation from the
employer, the employee and his or her dependents forfeit the right to sue
the employer for damages as a result of the injury.11 Thus, by avoiding
litigation, employees are assured relatively prompt payment for injuries
arising out of the course of their employment while employers are
protected from high negligence awards that could adversely affect a
company’s financial status.
B. The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws
Prior to 1972, state workers’ compensation laws varied tremendously.
As such, the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation
Law (the Commission) issued recommendations designed to create a
more uniform approach that promoted employee choice.12 Accordingly,
in virtually all states, an employee may now choose between filing a
workers’ compensation claim in (1) the state where the injury occurred,
(2) the state where the employment was principally localized, or (3) the
state where the employee was hired.13
8. Id. § 1.01 (2012) (explaining that “benefits to the employee include cash-wage benefits,
usually around one-half to two-thirds of the employee’s average weekly wage, and hospital, medical,
and rehabilitation expenses”).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. This is applicable insofar as negligence and contributory fault are concerned. However,
state laws may vary in the case of an intentional tort by the employer, intoxication of the employee, or
similarly egregious acts that have been excluded from coverage by the state legislature.
12. Id. § 143.01.
13. Id.
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The first aspect of the Commission’s recommendation has been
interpreted as a proposition that an in-state injury can “never” be
excluded from coverage.14 Supreme Court precedent appears to support
and is perhaps the basis for such an interpretation, as the Court has ruled
that a state retains “constitutional authority . . . to legislate for the bodily
safety and economic protection of employees injured within it” and has
pointed out that “[f]ew matters could be deemed more appropriately the
concern of the state in which the injury occurs or more completely
within its power.”15 Furthermore, the in-state injury aspect has not been
limited to the coverage of “acute injuries,”16 as many states have
broadly defined the in-state injury component to include “cumulative
trauma.”17 Generally, an acute injury occurs as the result of a specific
accident such as a slip, fall, or the lifting of an object.18 Conversely,
cumulative trauma may include a series of traumatic events arising out
of and in the course of employment,19 which may transpire over several
years.20
Despite the Commission’s use of the word “or” when formulating its
recommendations above, some states have decided to read
recommendations (2)—the state where the employment was principally
localized—and (3)—the state where the employee was hired—
conjunctively, so that both are required before an employee can recover
for injuries that occur outside of the state.21 For example, Virginia

14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Pac. Emp’rs. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 503 (1939). There is one
narrow exception to the “never” interpretation with respect to the exclusion of in-state injuries, as some
states deny coverage to transient employees upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. See LARSON,
supra note 7, § 143.01[3] (citing the California reciprocity statute, Cal. Labor Code § 3600.5 and noting
that California and states with similar approaches generally require that the employee be covered in
another state and that the other state be willing to grant reciprocity).
16. See, e.g., 1 NORMAN E. HARNED, KENTUCKY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 13.02 (2012); 1
WARREN L. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES & WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 4.05
(2012); 1 KIM E. PRESBREY, ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION GUIDEBOOK § 7.03 (2012) (citations
omitted).
17. See LARSON, supra note 7, § 50.04 (citing Burrell & Sons, Ltd. v. Selvage, 90 L.J. 1340
(H.L. 1921) (awarding compensation to an employee for the disabling effect of numerous cuts and
scratches which eventually led to infection and arthritis)).
18. 1 NORMAN E. HARNED, KENTUCKY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 13.02 (2012).
19. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011 (LexisNexis 2012).
20. See, e.g., 1 NORMAN E. HARNED, KENTUCKY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 13.08 (2012)
(citing Haycraft v. Corhart Refractories Co., 544 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1976) (apportioning compensation to
employee who had suffered two work-related and two non-work related back injuries during his 17
years of employment which required him to perform heavy labor); Prudential Overall Supply v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 76 Cal. Comp. Cases 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (awarding compensation
for cumulative trauma to both knees and low back of garment coordinator employee whose job duties
included gathering garments, loading them into carts, and taking them to a loading dock, which required
the employee to engage in frequent bending, stooping, and kneeling).
21. LARSON, supra note 7, § 143.01[2] (noting that this result can be attributed to judicial
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requires that “the place of contract and the employer’s place of business
are both within the state” and does not allow coverage at all if “the
contract is for services exclusively outside the state.”22 On the other
hand, some states have chosen to disjunctively analyze the employee’s
contacts with the state as well as the principal location of the
employment.23 This approach can be particularly helpful in the context
of transient employment, which some courts have classified as “a factdependent determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis.”24
Courts adopting this view believe that “the inquiry requires more than
simply tallying up the quantity of time the employee spends in each
jurisdiction” and instead look to the purpose of the employment.25
Lastly, where an employee was hired has also been interpreted quite
broadly. For example, the California Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board has ruled that a job offer via a phone conversation while the
employee is within the state may be sufficient even if the written
contract is signed in another state.26 In support of this position, the
Board stated that whether or not an employment relationship exists
“cannot be determined simply from technical contractual or common
law conceptions of employment . . . .”27 Rather, courts should look to
“the history and fundamental purposes underlying the [Workmen’s
Compensation] Act.”28
C. Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum Provisions
As indicated above, it is generally accepted that contractual
agreements cannot effectively enlarge or diminish the applicability of
state statutes.29 However, the Supreme Court has also indicated that
there is generally “a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of
freely
negotiated
contractual
choice-of-forum
provisions.”30
decision in some states and legislative action in others).
22. Id.
23. See id. (citing Texas Labor Code § 406.071, which explains, “[a]n employee has significant
contacts with this state if the employee was hired or recruited in this state and the employee: (1) was
injured not later than one year after the date of hire; or (2) has worked in Texas for at least 10 working
days during the 12 months preceding the date of injury.”).
24. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 683 (2011) (citing Hodgson v. Flippo Constr.
Co., 883 A.2d 211 (2005)), cert. granted, 21 A.3d 1063 (Md. June 17, 2011).
25. Id. at 683.
26. See Brache v. Tampa Bay Storm, 2010 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 339, at *22 (Cal. Wrk.
Comp. P.D. Aug. 26, 2010).
27. Id. at 19 (citing Laeng v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 494 P.2d 1, 4 (1972).
28. Id. at 5 (citations omitted); B. P. Schulberg Prod. v. Cal. Emp’t Comm’n, 66 Cal.App. 2d
831, 834–35 (1944).
29. See LARSON, supra note 7, § 143.07[1].
30. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985). See
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Accordingly, this Part will discuss attempts to contract around
applicable statutes as well as attempts to contract into inapplicable
statutes.
In 1935, the Supreme Court held that “[p]rima facie every state is
entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted.”31
As explained by Professor Larson,32 the overriding considerations are
that workers’ compensation is not a private matter to be settled by two
parties and that the public’s interest cannot be discounted because of
individual agreements.33 This contention finds support in Pacific
Employers Insurance Co. v. California, discussed infra, where the
Supreme Court relied heavily upon a California statute stating “[n]o
contract, rule or regulation shall exempt the employer from liability for
the compensation fixed by this act.”34 Consequently, it is generally
accepted that the most egregious employment agreements are those that
purport to destroy jurisdiction where it would otherwise exist.35
Lastly, an employee’s right to workers’ compensation is a product of
the employment relationship and would otherwise not exist.36 Thus, in
order for an employment agreement to be governed under the laws of a
particular state, “that State must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”37 In short, the parties
to an employment agreement cannot unilaterally confer jurisdiction
upon a state’s court system by virtue of private contract.
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
There are two famous Supreme Court cases dealing with workers’
compensation that continue to be cited in nearly every choice-of-law and
choice-of-forum dispute. The first, Alaska Packers Association v.
California,38 was decided in 1935 and established that for a foreign
state’s law to supersede the law of a forum state, the foreign state must

also Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Scherk v. Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974).
31. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. California, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
32. See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 686 (2011), cert. granted, 21 A.3d 1063
(Md. June 17, 2011).
33. See LARSON, supra note 7, § 143.07.
34. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939).
35. See LARSON, supra note 7, § 143.07 (citing Alaska Packers Ass’n v. California, 294 U.S. 532
(1935)).
36. See Chicago Bears v. Haynes, 816 F. Supp. 2d 534, 540 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
37. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
38. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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demonstrate a superior government interest.39 The second, Pacific
Employers Insurance Co. v. California,40 upheld Alaska Packers and
went on to articulate the limitations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
in the choice-of-forum context. This Part will discuss the cases in that
order.
In 1935, the Alaska Packers Association (Association) appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States to overturn a judgment of the
Supreme Court of California that upheld a compensation award by the
Industrial Accident Commission to one of the Association’s
employees.41 The award was given and upheld pursuant to the statutes
of California, where the contract was entered into; however, the contract
was performed in Alaska, where the injury eventually occurred.42
While the contract entered into between the employee and the
Association stated that the parties would be bound by Alaska
Workmen’s Compensation law, Section 58 of the California Workmen’s
Compensation Act provided:
The commission shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out
of injuries suffered without the territorial limits of this state in those cases
where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of the
43
injury and the contract of hire was made in this state.

After the Supreme Court recognized that states have the constitutional
authority to impose a system of compensation for injuries upon the
parties, it then set out to determine whether the due process clause
prevents a state from imposing liability for injuries occurring in another
state.44 Ultimately, the Court concluded that “where the contract is
entered into within the state . . . [t]he fact that [it] is to be performed
elsewhere does not of itself put these incidents beyond reach of the
power which a state may constitutionally exercise.”45 In reaching this
decision, the Court noted that the Packers employed fifty-three workers
for the summer in Alaska, the majority of who were from California.
Given that the two states are roughly 3,000 miles apart and that the
employment was seasonal in nature, the Court found that the California
statute was not “given such an unreasonable application . . . to transcend

39. Id. at 549.
40. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
41. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. California, 294 U.S. 532, 537 (1935).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 538 (citing CAL. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION CODE § 58 (1917)). In upholding the
award, the Court was satisfied with the California Supreme Court’s disjunctive reading of the latter part
of the statute which applies if the employee was a “resident of this state at the time of the injury and the
contract of hire was made in this state.” Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 540.
45. Id. at 540–41.
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constitutional limitations.”46 The Court also noted the difficulties
injured employees, as well as any potential witnesses, would encounter
in returning to Alaska to prosecute their claims for compensation.47
After concluding that the California statute did not involve an
arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of state power, the Court analyzed the
effect the statute had upon the employment agreement. In doing so, the
court noted that “[l]egislation otherwise within the scope of
acknowledged state power, not unreasonably or arbitrarily exercised,
cannot be condemned because it curtails the power of the individual to
contract.”48
Lastly, the Court analyzed the conflicting state laws under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause49 and concluded that a rigid and literal
enforcement of that clause that ignored the statute of the forum state
“would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the
statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but
cannot be in its own.”50 Rather than reach this absurd result by giving
automatic effect to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court explained
that the courts of each state must be allowed to consider and balance the
government interests of each state in reaching a decision.51 Thus, the
forum state’s law does not apply if, and only if, the foreign state can
demonstrate a superior government interest.52 Ultimately, the Court
concluded that because “[t]he interest of Alaska [was] not shown to be
superior to that of California,” there was no persuasive reason to prevent
a California court from applying California law.53
The U.S. Supreme Court confronted a similar Full Faith and Credit
Clause issue in Pacific Employers, where a chemical engineer was a
resident of Massachusetts and was regularly employed there under
written contract, but was subsequently injured while working
temporarily in California.54 Although the employee remained subject to
the general direction and control of the employer’s Massachusetts office
while working in California,55 he was able to institute proceedings
before the California Commission because he was injured during the

46.
47.
48.
(1931)).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 542.
Id.
Id. at 543 (citing Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 157–58
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547.
Id.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 550.
Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 497–98 (1939).
Id. at 497.
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course of his employment within the state.56
Just as it did in Alaska Packers, the California Supreme Court upheld
an award by the California Industrial Accident Commission despite the
contract provision purporting to render Massachusetts law the exclusive
remedy available to the employee.57 Under the Massachusetts statute,
the employee is deemed to have waived the “right of action at common
law or under the law of any other jurisdiction” in the absence of written
notice to the employer that he or she elects to retain such rights.58 On
the other hand, the California statute provided that “[n]o contract, rule or
regulation shall exempt the employer from liability for the compensation
fixed by this act.”59
In upholding the award, the California Supreme Court dismissed the
petitioner’s assertions that because the contract was entered into in
Massachusetts, and because the employee and employer consented to be
bound by the Massachusetts Act, the Massachusetts statute was
constitutionally entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of
California. In affirming the decision, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that
“the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not deny to the courts of
California the right to apply its own statute awarding compensation for
an injury suffered by an employee within the state.”60 The Court went
on to famously state:
To the extent that California is required to give full faith and credit to the
conflicting Massachusetts statute it must be denied the right to apply in its
own courts its own statute, constitutionally enacted in pursuance of its
policy to provide compensation for employees injured in their
employment within the state. It must withhold the remedy given by its
own statute to its residents by way of compensation for medical, hospital
and nursing services rendered to the injured employee, and it must remit
him to Massachusetts to secure the administrative remedy which that state
has provided. We cannot say that the full faith and credit clause goes so
61
far.

In short, the Court reiterated that there are limitations as to when the
Full Faith and Credit Clause requires a state to enforce a judgment or
apply the law of another state when doing so would contravene its own
statutes or policy.62
56. Id. at 498.
57. Id. at 497.
58. Id. at 498 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, §§ 24–26 (West 1932)).
59. Id. at 499 (citing CAL. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION CODE § 27(a) (Deering 1931). See also
Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 184 Cal. 26 (1920)).
60. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 501.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 502. The Court went on to state that “[i]t would be obnoxious to that policy . . . [to]
require physicians and hospitals to go to another state to collect charges for medical care and
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IV. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
Because the workers’ compensation statutes in most states do not
expressly mention the treatment of professional athletes, courts have
been charged with deciding whether or not athletes are eligible to
receive workers’ compensation.63 Despite the occasional “assumption
of risk” argument by an employer of a professional football player, it is
generally accepted that professional football players may not be
prohibited from recovering workers’ compensation simply because they
are “engaged in an occupation that by its very nature renders injury
commonplace.”64 Indeed, there is only one case to date that has found
that a professional football player cannot recover for injuries suffered in
the course of employment due to the injuries not being classified as
“accidental.”65 On the other hand, a plethora of cases have found that
professional athletes, including football players, are eligible for workers’
compensation.66 Furthermore, some states statutorily prohibit the denial
of coverage on the basis of the risk typically associated with the
employment of the covered employee.67
treatment . . . .” Id. at 504 (citing Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 75 P.2d 1058
(1938)).
63. See Michelle L. Modery, Comment, Injury Time-Out: Justifying Workers’ Compensation
Awards to Retired Athletes with Concussion-Caused Dementia, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 247, 256–57 (2011).
64. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 689 (2011), cert. granted, 21 A.3d 1063 (Md.
June 17, 2011).
65. See Palmer v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 621 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). A
similar case, Rowe v. Baltimore Colts, 454 A.2d 872, 878 (1983), was overruled by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in 2012. See Pro-Football v. Tupa, 51 A.3d 544, 552 (Md. 2012) (quoting
Professor Larson’s criticism of “the kind of loose thinking” that characterizes sports injuries as not
accidental: “[a]s a little reflection will show, this is tantamount to saying that the player in effect
intended to get himself injured. This is, of course, preposterous. True, some of these sports are rough.
But everything about them is elaborately designed to prevent actual disabling physical injury. All the
forbidden practices—clipping, piling-on, face-masking, spearing, unnecessary roughness, and a host of
others—are precisely intended to do everything possible to forestall injury . . . .”). See also Professor
Larson’s criticism of Palmer in LARSON, supra note 7, § 22.04[1][b] (stating “[t]his decision is wrong.
Just how conspicuously wrong can quickly be demonstrated by a check-list of four respects in which its
wrongness makes it unique in the history of workers’ compensation. (1) It is the only surviving
appellate decision denying compensation for injury in a professional team sport. (2) It is the only case
in history in which a class of employees has been told, first, that they are covered by the compensation
act but, second, they are not protected when doing the very job they were hired to do. (3) It is the only
case in compensation history in which unintended traumatic injuries have been held non-accidental. (4)
It is the only category of employees as to whom the doctrine of assumption of risk has been reintroduced
by the court, after having been deliberately ruled out by the legislature.”).
66. See, e.g., Pro–Football, Inc. v. D.C. Dept. Of Emp’t Servs., 588 A.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Knelson v. Meadowlanders, Inc., 732 P.2d 808 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987); Boden v. Detroit Lions, Inc., 483
N.W.2d 673 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Brinkman v. Buffalo Bills Football Club, 433 F.Supp. 699
(W.D.N.Y.1977); Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 604 A.2d 319 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992).
67. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-507 (West 2012) (providing that “[c]ompensation
may not be denied to a covered employee because of the degree of risk of the employment of the
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Accordingly, a significant number of states have decided to
specifically include professional athletes via statute. In these states,
athletes are either expressly mentioned within the definition of
“employee,” or they are included by virtue of endorsement by the
Attorney General.68 However, in light of the relatively high salaries of
professional athletes, many of the states specifically choosing to include
professional athletes also place limits upon the amount of compensation
available.69
In Florida, Massachusetts, and Wyoming, professional athletes are
specifically excluded from workers’ compensation coverage. In 1983,
three former Miami Dolphins football players challenged the Florida
law on constitutional grounds.70 The District Court of Appeal of Florida
held that the exclusion of professional athletes did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.71 The court focused
on the regular occurrence of serious injuries, the salaries of professional
football players, and the players’ conscious decision to use their skills in
a high-risk occupation in making its determination that the legislature’s
exclusion of professional athletes was not wholly arbitrary in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.72 Nevertheless, professional athletes
employed within these three states are usually not left without a remedy.
For example, Article 41, Section 1 of the NFL CBA provides:
In any state where workers’ compensation coverage is not compulsory or
where a Club is excluded from a state’s workers’ compensation coverage,
covered employee.”).
68. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-508(b) (2012); See also Modery, supra note 63, at 257–58 (citing
Applicability of Indus. Ins. Act to Certain Athletes, Op. Att’y Gen. Wash. 5 (Feb. 14, 1984), available
at http://www.atg.wa.gov/AGOOpinions/opinion.aspx?section=topic&id=7566 (reasoning that all
employees are covered under the statute unless specifically excluded and that Washington has no
exclusionary provision)).
69. For example, in Pennsylvania and Michigan, athlete’s wages are capped at 200% of the
state’s average weekly wage. See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 565 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 418.360 (2012). In the District of Columbia, workers’ compensation is based upon a calculation
of the “professional athlete’s work life expectancy” by the Office of Workers’ Compensation. See D.C.
CODE § 32-1501(17C). Thus, states may limit both the amount and duration of workers’ compensation
benefits available to professional athletes. In addition to the limitations just discussed, there are a few
other categories of treatment of professional athletes that deserve recognition. In West Virginia, the
athlete’s employer may decide whether or not to subscribe to the state’s workers’ compensation system.
See W. VA. CODE § 23-2-1(b)(6) (West 2012). In Texas, the athlete may elect to receive compensation
from the state system or from the state included within his or her contract or collective bargaining
agreement. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.095(a) (West 2011). Lastly, Missouri and Ohio have
enacted “set-off” provisions, which reduce employee benefits in proportion to the contract benefits
already paid to the injured athlete. See Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, Squeeze
Play: Workers’ Compensation and the Professional Athlete, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 95,
111 (1995).
70. Rudolph v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 447 So. 2d 284, 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
71. Id. at 291–92.
72. Id.
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a Club will either voluntarily obtain coverage under the compensation
laws of that state or otherwise guarantee equivalent benefits to its players.
In the event that a player qualifies for benefits under this section, such
benefits will be equivalent to those benefits paid under the compensation
73
law of the state in which his Club is located.

Lastly, in Kentucky, professional athletes who have been hired
outside the Commonwealth by an employer domiciled in another state
are exempted from receiving workers’ compensation.74 Interestingly,
the Kentucky exemption covers employees that are temporarily
employed within the Commonwealth, provided that the employer has
purchased workers’ compensation insurance coverage under the law of
its state of domicile.75 Thus, in Kentucky, the workers’ compensation
law of the foreign state provides the exclusive remedy for injured
athletes.76
V. FEDERAL PREEMPTION ISSUES AND THE ROLE OF AN NFL ARBITRATOR
This Part will begin by discussing the various federal preemption
issues that arise when determining the scope of arbitration provisions
contained within CBAs and employment contracts. Put differently, this
Part will address when an arbitrator has the authority to render a
decision regarding substantive rights afforded by statute. Then, it will
discuss the NFL Arbitrator’s limited role as an interpreter of the CBA or
“contract reader,” who determines only whether either party has
breached the agreement.77
A. Federal Preemption Issues
The majority of federal preemption disputes focus on whether or not
the parties are required to arbitrate certain claims as well as the
standards for overturning an arbitral award.78 As a general rule,
individual contracts are covered by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
while collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) are governed by the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).79
73. NFL CBA, supra note 1, at 176. It should be noted that the CBA at issue in Rudolph v.
Miami Dolphins contained a similar provision, which appears to have influenced the court’s analysis to
a certain degree. See Rudolph, 447 So. 2d at 290.
74. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.670(4) (West 2012).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Newson, 783 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (citing
NFLPA/Harvey v. NFLMC/Buffalo Bills Arbitration (Feb. 14, 2007) (Das, Arb.)).
78. See id.
79. See Int’l Chem. Workers Union v. Columbian Chems. Co., 331 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 2003)
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The FAA establishes a national preference to arbitrate disputes
between parties who have contracted to do so.80 As such, when the
parties agree to arbitrate all disputes arising under a contract, the
arbitrator, not the courts, typically resolves the issues.81 However, the
FAA is also concerned with assuring that agreements between private
parties are enforced according to their terms.82 Thus, the FAA considers
the wishes of the contracting parties83 and “does not require [them] to
arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so . . . nor does it prevent
parties who do agree to arbitrate from excluding certain claims from the
scope of their agreement.”84
The consequence of the FAA is that an agreement to arbitrate does
not deprive a party of substantive rights afforded by statute.85 Rather,
the parties agree only to resolve the dispute in a different forum.86 As
articulated by the Supreme Court, the dispositive issue is “not whether
the FAA preempts the [state statute] wholesale. The FAA plainly has no
such destructive aim or effect. Instead, the question is simply who
decides . . . .”87
Section 301 of LMRA allows suits relating to “violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization” to be brought within
“any district court of the United States having jurisdiction [over] the
parties . . .”88 as long as the labor organization represents employees in
an “industry affecting commerce.”89 Additionally, the suits may be
brought irrespective of the amount in controversy or citizenship of the
parties.90
The majority of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the
LMRA, not the FAA, applies to CBAs. This approach developed after
the Supreme Court stated that CBAs are not “contracts of employment,”
a major area of FAA coverage.91 The Supreme Court emphasized that
CBAs are not contracts of employment because “no one has a job by
reason of [a CBA] and no obligation to any individual ordinarily comes

(“The LMRA applies to CBAs and the FAA applies to individual arbitration agreements.”).
80. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
81. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448–49 (2006).
82. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53–54 (1995); Volt Info. Scis.
v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
83. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57.
84. Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 479.
85. Gilmer v. Interstate, 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
86. See id.
87. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 352 (2008) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
88. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (2012).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334–35 (1944).
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into existence from it alone.”92 Accordingly, the majority of circuits
have determined that LMRA applies to CBAs, while the FAA may only
be relied upon for guidance when reviewing an arbitration award.93
Despite its refusal to recognize CBAs as contracts of employment, the
Supreme Court has not been wholly hostile to arbitration provisions
contained within CBAs.94 Rather, the Court has stated that when an
agreement has been collectively bargained in good faith and freely
negotiated by the parties with respect to the items subject to mandatory
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act,95 “the CBA’s
arbitration provision must be honored unless the [statute] itself removes
[a] particular class of grievances . . . .”96 As the Court explained in
Gilmer v. Interstate,97 “[a]lthough all statutory claims may not be
appropriate for arbitration, ‘[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the
party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue.’”98
The Supreme Court has also stated that a union-negotiated waiver of
employees’ statutory rights must be “clear and unmistakable.”99 Put
differently, “the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient
importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver in a
CBA.”100 As such, a general requirement to submit “all matters under
dispute” to arbitration is insufficient.101 For such general language to be
accepted, the statutes in question must be explicitly incorporated into the
agreement.102
Nevertheless, the Federal Courts of Appeals have different opinions
as to what constitutes a clear and unmistakable waiver. The First Circuit
has held that the lack of a statute’s explicit mention does not result in a

92. Id. at 335.
93. E.g., Int’l Chem. Workers Union v. Columbian Chems. Co., 331 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir.
2003); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 52, 53 (2d
Cir. 2001) (“We hold that in cases brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act . . . the FAA does not apply.”); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879
(4th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n this circuit, the FAA is not applicable to labor disputes arising from collective
bargaining agreements.”).
94. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2012).
96. 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 248.
97. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
98. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985)).
99. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 80–81.
102. See id. at 80.
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per se bar.103 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has stated that the
employees’ agreement to submit to arbitration “all . . . causes of action
arising out of their employment” may be sufficient.104 On the other
hand, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have taken much more stringent
approaches. In the Sixth Circuit, “a statute must specifically be
mentioned in a CBA for it to even approach Wright’s ‘clear and
unmistakable’ standard.”105 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit requires that a
CBA expressly state which statutory claims are subject to arbitration.106
B. The Role of an NFL Arbitrator
Although an agreement to arbitrate claims arising under a contract or
CBA does not result in a forfeiture of statutory rights,107 NFL arbitrators
have shown a tendency to limit their role to that of a “contract reader”
responsible for interpreting and applying the terms of the CBA or Player
Contract rather than opining on “how the appropriate state authority
should treat actions taken by the parties pursuant to state workers’
compensation law.”108 Indeed, while Article 15, Section 1 of the NFL
CBA lists the specific areas in which the System Arbitrator shall have
exclusive jurisdiction,109 Article 41, which is entitled “Workers’
Compensation,” is specifically excluded from that list. Thus, the
combination of Article 15 and the approach typically adopted by NFL
arbitrators suggests that the NFL and NFLPA did not “clearly and
unmistakably” waive the right to a judicial forum in workers’
compensation cases.110

103. Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1999).
104. Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331–32 (4th Cir. 1999).
105. Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1999).
106. Doyle v. Raley’s Inc., 158 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1998).
107. Gilmer v. Interstate, 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
108. NFLPA/Harvey v. NFLMC/Buffalo Bills Arbitration (Feb. 14, 2007) (Das, Arb.)
(concluding that NFLPA was entitled to a declaration from the arbitrator on the meaning of contract
provisions and that interpretation of “‘state workers’ compensation laws is a matter to be decided in the
appropriate state or federal forum, not arbitration under the CBA”). This approach is supported by
Supreme Court precedent: the Court has noted that “[b]ecause the arbitrator is required to effectuate the
intent of the parties, rather than to enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public
policies underlying the FLSA, thus depriving an employee of protected statutory rights.” Barrentine v.
Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981).
109. NFL CBA, supra note 1, at 113 (“Section 1. Appointment: The parties agree that the System
Arbitrator shall have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the terms of Articles 1, 4, 6-1 9, 26–28, 31, or 68–
70 of this Agreement (except as provided in those Articles with respect to disputes determined by the
Impartial Arbitrator, the Accountants, or another arbitrator).”).
110. See Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 783 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (citing AFL/Tampa Bay Storm v.
AFLPA/Brache & Daniels (May 15, 2009) (observing that none of the agreements in question “clearly
and unmistakably waives any right covered employees might have to file workers’ compensation claims
in states other than Florida” and “[a]bsent such clarity, any attempted waiver must fail”)).
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In one of the most recent arbitrations, Arbitrator Townley observed:
“It is clear . . . that any interpretation of state workers’ compensation
law is to be left to state or other authorities and not to the arbitrator, who
is confined to the interpretation of the provisions of the CBA and the
Players’ Contracts.”111
Similarly, Arbitrator Das has repeatedly
expressed his lack of authority to render decisions under state workers’
compensation law.112 On the other hand, Das has also stated that “there
is an issue as to whether a state tribunal is free to interpret a provision in
the CBA . . . on its own without regard to [arbitrators or law of the
shop].”113 In short, the arbitrator is only responsible for deciding
whether a player breached his player contract by filing in a jurisdiction
other than that which is listed in his contract.114 However, a court’s
jurisdiction is not preempted while such contract interpretation
arbitration proceeds.115
VI. RECENT NFL CASES
As discussed above, several choice-of-law and choice-of-forum cases
involving NFL players have recently been decided on appeal at both the
state and federal level. The typical NFL case begins when a player or
group of players decide to file a workers’ compensation claim in
California, despite contract language that provides otherwise.116
Subsequently, the club will respond by seeking an injunction or an
arbitration decision that the players are in breach of contract.117 While it
may not be possible to discern each individual player’s motivation for
filing in California, there are two explanations that seem more plausible
than others. First, the Supreme Court of California has stated that
“workmen’s compensation statutes are to be construed liberally in favor
111. Id. at 776; see also Chicago Bears v. Haynes, 816 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
112. See Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 783 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (citing NFLPA/Harvey v. NFLMC/Buffalo
Bills Arbitration (Feb. 14, 2007) (Das, Arb.); Chicago Bears v. Haynes (Apr. 21, 2011) (Townley, Arb.).
See also Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Abdullah, No. 1:09-cv-738, 2010 WL 1857270 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 28,
2010).
113. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 783 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (citing NFLPA/Harvey v. NFLMC/Buffalo
Bills Arbitration (Feb.14, 2007) (Das, Arb.)).
114. See id. at 777–78.
115. See id. at 779 (citing AFL/Tampa Bay Storm v. AFLPA/Brache & Daniels (May 15, 2009)
(observing that none of the agreements in question “clearly and unmistakably waives any right covered
employees might have to file workers’ compensation claims in states other than Florida”); Cincinnati
Bengals, Inc. v. Abdullah, No. 1:09-cv-738, 2010 WL 1857270, at *10–11 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2010).
116. See, e.g., NFLMC/Tennessee Titans and NFLPA/Matthews Arbitration (Aug. 5, 2010)
(Sharpe, Arb.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Titans & Matthews Arbitration]; NFL Players Ass’n v.
NFL Mgmt. Council, No. 10CV1671, 2011 WL 31068 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011); Pro-Football, Inc. v.
Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 683 (2011), cert. granted, 21 A.3d 1063 (Md. June 17, 2011).
117. See, e.g., Titans & Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116; NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL Mgmt.
Council, No. 10CV1671, 2011 WL 31068 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011); Tupa, 14 A.3d at 683.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/11

16

Holbrook: Home Field Advantage? An Analysis of Workers' Compensation Choice

2012]

COMMENT—NFL CONTRACTS

747

of awarding compensation.”118 Second, in 2001, the California
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board held that it had jurisdiction over
a nonresident player’s claim for cumulative trauma despite the fact that
his contract was neither negotiated nor executed in California.119
Accordingly, this Part will discuss the procedural history of recent
cases.
A. Matthews v. Tennessee Titans
Before retiring in 2002, Bruce Matthews played 19 seasons for the
Tennessee Titans and its predecessors the Tennessee Oilers and Houston
Oilers.120 Paragraph 26D of Matthews’ contract stated:
[Jurisdiction of all workers’ compensation claims and] all issues of law,
issues of fact, and matters related to workers compensation benefits shall
be exclusively determined by and exclusively decided in accordance with
the internal laws of the State of Tennessee without resort to choice of law
121
rules.

In 2008, the Titans and the NFL Management Council (NFLMC) filed a
non-injury grievance against Matthews protesting his pursuit of
workers’ compensation in California.122 When the grievance request
was refused, the parties submitted the dispute to arbitration. The issues
to be arbitrated were as follows: First, did Bruce Matthews violate his
Player Contract by filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits in
California and requesting that the claim be processed under California
Law? Second, if Matthews did violate his Player Contract by filing in
California, what is the appropriate remedy?123
The Titans argued that Matthews’ Player Contract unambiguously
required him to file his claims in Tennessee or Texas and that his breach
could not be excused by an argument that the contract provision above

118. Laeng v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 771, 778 (Cal. 1972).
119. See CAL LAB. CODE § 3600.5 (Deering 2012) (citing Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund of Md. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 66 Cal. Comp. Cases 923 (Cal. App. 2001) (awarding compensation to a
player for cumulative trauma based on injury he sustained during a single California football game
while playing for the Baltimore Colts)). But see Brown v. Cincinnati Bengals, No. ADJ1220066 (Cal.
W.C.A.B. Apr. 19, 2011) (on file with author) (reversing finding of jurisdiction over Bengals player
employed by club from 1985–1992 who claimed to have sustained injuries arising out of and in the
course of his employment to his head, neck, shoulders, elbows, wrists, hands, hips, back, spine, legs,
knees, ankles, and feet. The judge found the player to have been only temporarily employed within the
state of California in light of the fact that only 7 of his 150 career games were played within the state).
120. See Titans & Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116.
121. NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL Mgmt. Council, No. 10CV1671, 2011 WL 31068, at *1 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 5, 2011).
122. See Titans & Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116.
123. Id. at 2.
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was a choice-of-law rather than a choice-of-forum provision.124 The
Titans also argued that his claim for benefits under California law made
any distinction between the two irrelevant.125 Next, the Titans
attempted to distinguish the case from Alaska Packers by citing
Matthews’ residency and work in both Texas and Tennessee as evidence
that he would not be without a remedy.126 In short, the Titans argued
“the Player’s agreement is to forgo all forums except Tennessee and
Texas, not to forgo the benefits [altogether].”127 Lastly, the Titans
argued that an arbitrator may issue a cease and desist order against a
player who breaches his Player Contract by filing in an improper
forum.128
Conversely, Matthews argued that by filing in California, under
California law, he did not breach his Player Contract.129 In Matthews’
view, Paragraph 26D was “at most a ‘choice of law’ clause” requiring
the application of Tennessee workers’ compensation law, which permits
the filing of workers’ compensation claims in other states.130 Therefore,
Matthews claimed that Alaska Packers, California public policy, and the
California court’s decision warranted the arbitrator’s deference, and that
such deference would also be consistent with past NFL arbitration
decisions.131 Matthews then argued that Alaska Packers stands for the
absolute standard that parties may not contract around applicable
statutes.132
Arbitrator Sharpe’s opinion began by explaining that the central issue
in the case was whether Paragraph 26D was a choice-of-forum clause or
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 6.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 7 (citing arbitration precedent holding that a cease and desist order is appropriate
where “a party’s action under a state workers’ compensation law contravenes the requirements in the
CBA”).
129. Id.
130. Id. See also Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439 (1933) (employee filed
and received compensation in Ohio under the Tennessee statute); True v. Amerail Corp., 584 S.W. 2d.
794 (Tenn. 1979) (recovery in Virginia permissible and preclusive of recovery in Tennessee).
131. See Titans & Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116.
132. Matthews cited extensive authority in support of his argument. See id. at 7–10 (citing Alaska
Packers Ass’n v. California, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) and Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n,
306 U.S. 493 (1939); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth of Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (finding
that CBA cannot supersede state minimum health standards); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994)
(state employee benefits not superseded by collectively bargained benefits under the preemption
doctrine); Contract Servs. Network, Inc. v. Aubry, 62 F.3d 294 (9th Cir. 1995) (workers’ compensation
benefits formula under a collective bargaining agreement did not preempt the California Workers
Compensation Statute); Brache v. Tampa Bay Storm, 2010 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 339 (Cal.
Wrk. Comp. P.D. Aug. 26, 2010) (player injured in California did not waive benefits under California
law despite CBA that purported to waive benefits outside of Florida). See also supra text accompanying
notes 38–62.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/11

18

Holbrook: Home Field Advantage? An Analysis of Workers' Compensation Choice

2012]

COMMENT—NFL CONTRACTS

749

a choice-of-law clause. Sharpe explained that the former would prevent
Matthews from filing a claim in California while the latter would only
require the application of Tennessee law and would not imply a
selection of forum.133 After acknowledging the difficulties associated
with the drafting and interpretation of forum clauses, Sharpe noted the
“awkwardness” of the use of the term “jurisdiction” within Paragraph
26D.134 Consequently, Sharpe noted Tennessee law does not claim
exclusive jurisdiction for workers’ compensation claims and that
jurisdiction is one of many issues to be decided by and in accordance
with Tennessee law.135
Nonetheless, Sharpe emphasized his role as a “contract reader” and
concluded that Paragraph 26D was a “mutual obligation” provision,
requiring both the player and team to assure the application of
Tennessee law.136 As such, he found that Matthews’ filing for
California benefits in California was a breach of the contract.137 Finally,
Sharpe instructed the parties to stipulate to the application of Tennessee
law before the California tribunals.138 He then stated that a refusal to
accept such stipulation by the tribunals would require the parties
withdraw, thereby foreclosing any further relief in California.139
Following the arbitration decision, the NFLPA made a motion on
Matthews’ behalf to vacate the arbitration award in U.S. District Court
in the Southern District of California.140 The court began its analysis by
stating the four instances in which it may vacate an arbitration award
under § 301 of the LMRA:
(1) when the award does not draw its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement and the arbitrator is dispensing his own brand of
industrial justice;
(2) where the arbitrator exceeds the boundaries of the issues submitted to
him;
(3) when the award is contrary to public policy; or

133. See Titans & Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116, at 10–11.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id. Sharpe noted Matthews’ citations to other cases allowing the application of Tennessee
law in other forums.
136. Id. at 14–15.
137. Id. at 15.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The NFLPA made “three arguments for overturning the arbitration award. First . . . that the
award is contrary to California law and public policy. Second . . . that the award is contrary to federal
labor law. And finally . . . that the award violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” NFL Players Ass’n
v. NFL Mgmt. Council, No. 10CV1671, 2011 WL 31068, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011). The NLFMC
and the Titans countered with a motion to confirm the arbitration award.
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141

(4) when the award is procured by fraud.

Additionally, the court “assume[d], without deciding, that the
‘manifest disregard of the law’ basis for vacatur” under the FAA was
also available in § 301 actions.142 The court then stated that whether the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law and whether the award was
contrary to public policy were the only two bases under which it would
consider vacatur.143 Lastly, the court noted that its review was “limited
and deferential” and that the court “does not sit to hear claims of factual
or legal error.”144
In light of its limited and deferential review, the court concluded that
arbitrator Sharpe did not manifestly disregard the Full Faith and Credit
Clause by failing to address the same in his ruling against Matthews.145
Rather, the court noted that Matthews failed to “show the arbitrator
understood and correctly stated the law, but proceeded to disregard the
same.”146
Next, the court explained the “contrary to public policy” standard
applies only to those policies that are “explicit, well-defined, and
dominant”147 while also providing a “reference to the laws and legal
precedents [rather than] general considerations . . . .”148 Additionally,
the party seeking vacatur has the burden of showing that the policy
specifically militates against the arbitrator’s award.149 Ultimately, the
court noted that it was not in a position to determine Matthews’
eligibility for California workers’ compensation and held that California
law, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and federal law, as argued by
Matthews, did not constitute explicit, well-defined, and dominant public
policy sufficient to result in vacatur of the arbitrator’s award.150
Consequently, Matthews filed an appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
In considering Matthews’ request to “vacate an arbitration award that
prohibits him from pursuing workers’ compensation benefits under
California law,” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Matthews
had not alleged sufficient contacts with the state of California and
therefore had not met his burden of demonstrating that the award

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987)).
Id.
Id. at *7–8.
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deprived him of something he was entitled to under state law.151 The
Ninth Circuit also stated that Matthews had not shown a violation of
federal labor policy or that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.152 The crux of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
focused on the fact that when Matthews filed for workers’ compensation
in 2008 he claimed only that his injuries were the result of his being
“employed by the NFL at ‘various’ locations over 19 years . . . .”153 The
court criticized Matthews for using the “‘various’ locations” language in
his 2008 application for workers’ compensation, for his failure to allege
that he had played football in California or that he suffered any discrete
injury in California, and for his argument in briefing—without citation
to the record—that he was injured in California.154 The Ninth Circuit
then noted that while Matthews may be correct that nearly every game
contributed to his cumulative injuries, it is not clear, as a matter of
California law, that this would allow him to qualify for California
workers’ compensation benefits.155
In short, the Ninth Circuit declined to interpret California’s policy
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Alaska Packers as guaranteeing a
universal right to seek California workers’ compensation benefits.156
Rather, under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, the California workers’
compensation statute establishes the rule that employees who are
“otherwise eligible for California benefits cannot be deemed to have
contractually waived those benefits . . . .”157 Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit went on to explain:
To be precise, we do not hold that employers may use binding arbitration
of choice-of-law clauses as a means to evade California law where it
would otherwise apply. Nor must an employee challenging an arbitration
award show that he necessarily would prevail on his workers'
compensation claim before a California tribunal. An employee who
makes a prima facie showing that his claim falls within the scope of
California’s workers’ compensation regime may indeed be able to
establish that an arbitration award prohibiting him from seeking such
benefits violates California policy. Matthews did not do so here because
he did not allege facts showing an injury in California or any burden on
the state’s medical system, and it is not clear that California would extend
its workers’ compensation regime to cover the cumulative injuries
151. Matthews v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1113-14. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit did take judicial notice that Matthews played
13 games in California during his 19 year career.
155. Id.
156. Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1111.
157. Id.
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158

Matthews claims, given his limited contacts with the state.

Similarly, in rejecting Matthews’ manifest disregard arguments, the
Ninth Circuit stated that because Matthews had failed to show that the
“Full Faith and Credit Clause guarantees California’s right to apply its
law on the facts of this case, he [did not establish] that the arbitrator
recognized yet chose to ignore ‘well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable’ law.”159
B. Chicago Bears v. Haynes
In 2009 and 2010, three former Chicago Bears players filed claims for
workers’ compensation benefits before the California Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board seeking benefits under California law.160
The Bears, along with the NFL Management Council, responded by
filing grievances to be heard before Arbitrator Rosemary Townley, who
concluded that the language of the player contracts contained both
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions which required that all
workers’ compensation claims be brought before the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Commission and adjudicated pursuant to Illinois law.161
In so concluding, Arbitrator Townley found the Matthews decision to
have preclusive effect under the “law of the shop.”162 Further, she
found that the players breached the forum selection clauses of their
Player Contracts by filing in California and proceeded to issue a cease
and desist order.163 Arbitrator Townley supported her conclusions by
emphasizing that the Bears are located in Illinois, the contracts were
executed and substantially performed in Illinois, and that the parties had
freely negotiated the choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions.164
Unhappy with the result, the players filed an appeal in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.165
On appeal, the court emphasized an NFL arbitrator’s limited role as a
contract reader, as well as the general rule that parties who submit to
binding arbitration must abide by the result.166 However, the court also
explained that it is allowed to consider de novo whether the arbitrator’s

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
2011)).

Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1116-17.
Chicago Bears v. Haynes, 816 F. Supp. 2d 534, 535 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
See id. at 536 (citing Chicago Bears v. Haynes (Apr. 21, 2011) (Townley, Arb.)).
See id.
Id.
See id. at 538.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 537 (citing Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Newson, 783 F.Supp.2d 769, 774–76 (W.D. Pa.
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award is contrary to well defined and dominant public policy.167 The
court went on to briefly summarize the “numerous pages” which each
side had devoted to making California public policy arguments, which
focused mainly on Alaska Packers, before criticizing both parties for
failing to address the “obvious threshold question: why is California’s
public policy relevant at all?”168 The court concluded by reiterating that
a state must have a significant contact or aggregation of contacts in
order to prevent the arbitrary and fundamentally unfair application of its
laws.169 Nonetheless, the players have filed an appeal in the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.170
C. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa
Thomas Tupa was employed as a punter for the Washington Redskins
(Redskins) from 2004 until 2006.171 Tupa suffered a career-ending
injury to his back while warming up for a Redskins preseason game in
2005.172 Subsequently, Tupa filed a claim with the Maryland Workers’
Compensation Commission, which was contested by the Redskins, inter
alia, for lack of jurisdiction.173 The Redskins based their jurisdictional
arguments on the forum selection clause of Tupa’s contract, which
contained the following provision:
JURISDICTION. The parties hereto agree that this Player Contract shall
for all purposes be deemed to have been negotiated and executed in
Virginia; that should any dispute, claim or cause of action (collectively
“dispute”) arise concerning rights or liabilities arising from the
relationship between the Player and the Club, the parties hereto agree that
the law governing such dispute shall be the law of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and that the exclusive jurisdiction for resolving such dispute in
the case of Workers’ Compensation is the Virginia Workers’
Compensation Commission, and in the case of Workers’ Compensation
174
claims the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act shall govern.

Despite this provision, the Maryland Workers’ Compensation
Commission found that Maryland, not Virginia, had jurisdiction over the
167. Id. (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
168. Id. at 538.
169. Id. at 541 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312 (1981)).
170. See NFL Workers’ Compensation Court Cases, SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/01/23/Labor-and-Agents/Workers-compcases.aspx.
171. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 679 (2011), cert. granted, 21 A.3d 1063 (Md. June
17, 2011).
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 684.
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claim.175 On review, the court emphasized that Tupa’s injury occurred
while he was working in Maryland and that he was expected to play
eight regular season games and two preseason games in Maryland each
season.176 Additionally, the court emphasized that the Redskins were
incorporated in Maryland, that the Redskins’ home games were played
in Maryland, and that the incident occurred at FedEx field in Landover,
Maryland.177 By doing so, the court was able to refute the Redskins’
argument that the location of the Redskins practice facility in Virginia
along with the contractual provision above would lead to the conclusion
that Tupa was employed primarily in Virginia and only temporarily in
Maryland.178
Similarly, the court stated that although Tupa was hired in Virginia,
the “purpose of his employment was to play professional football at
FedEx Field in Maryland and at various other stadiums around the
country.”179 Likewise, the court found that the purpose of Tupa’s
employment also superseded his spending the majority of his time as an
employee at the Redskins’ Virginia practice facility.180 In so finding,
the court emphasized that the jurisdictional inquiry requires more than a
simple tallying of time in each jurisdiction.181
Lastly, the court discussed the Supreme Court’s observation that there
is “a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of freely negotiated
contractual choice-of-forum provisions.”182 However, the court noted
that the presumption that a choice-of-forum clause is valid and
enforceable is rebuttable if the resisting party demonstrates that it
unreasonably contravenes a strong public policy of the state where the
action is filed.183 Here, the Maryland statute provides:
[A] covered employee or an employer of a covered employee may not by
agreement, rule, or regulation:
(i) exempt the covered employee or the employer from a duty of the
covered employee or the employer under this title; or
(ii) waive a right of the covered employee or the employer under this
175. Id. at 680.
176. Id. at 682.
177. Id. at 683.
178. Id. at 682–83.
179. Id. at 683.
180. Id. at 683–84.
181. Id. at 683. Thus, the court was also able to refute the Redskins’ argument that Tupa was
excluded from coverage under MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 9-203(b)(1) (West 2012), which
provides, in relevant part: “An individual is not a covered employee while working in this State for an
employer only intermittently or temporarily if: (i) the individual and employer make a contract of hire in
another state . . . .” Id. at 682.
182. Id. at 684 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985) (internal citations omitted).
183. See id. at 685.
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184

title.

Accordingly, the court noted that any agreement violating this provision
is void under state law.185 After finding that Tupa was a covered
employee, and implying that the Redskins were a covered employer,186
the court went on to cite Professor Larson’s contention that “the
overriding consideration [is] that compensation is not a private matter to
be arranged between two parties; the public has a profound interest in
the matter which cannot be altered by any individual agreements”187 and
noted that many other states share this view as being consistent with
Alaska Packers.188
The Redskins appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which
affirmed the lower court’s decision on August 22, 2012.189 The Court of
Appeals of Maryland emphasized that the Maryland statute, in plain,
unambiguous language, precluded agreements that purport to exempt
employers from workers’ compensation liability as well as those that
waive an employee’s rights to receive benefits.190 The Court of Appeals
explained that allowing forum selection clauses to constitute an
exception to the Maryland statute would contravene basic statutory
interpretation principles and “would be to re-draft the statute under the
guise of construction.”191 Lastly, the Court of Appeals cited “numerous
cases in other states that have also refused to give effect to forum
selection clauses in workers’ compensation cases.”192
VII. ANALYSIS
As the previous Parts illustrate, courts have adopted relatively
inconsistent approaches regarding choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
provisions. Further, this inconsistency seems to be exacerbated by the
184. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 9–104(a)(1) (West 2012)).
185. See MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 9–104(a)(2).
186. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 682–85 (2011), cert. granted, 21 A.3d 1063 (Md.
June 17, 2011).
187. Id. at 685 (citing 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 143.07 (2010)).
188. Id. at 686, n.7 (citing Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 597
(1947); Miller v. Hirschbach Motor Lines, Inc., 714 S.W.2d 652, 655–56 (Mo. App. 1986); Gotkin v.
Weinberg, 2 N.J. 305, 308 (1949); Giltner v. Commodore Contract Carriers, 14 Or. App. 340, 344–45
(1973); Robert M. Neff v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd., 155 Pa. Cmwlth. 44 (1993); Jenkins v. Sal
Chem. Co., 167 W. Va. 616, 618 (1981)).
189. Pro-Football v. Tupa, 51 A.3d 544 (Md. 2012).
190. Id. at 549.
191. Id. (citing Montrose Christian School v. Walsh, 770 A.2d 111 (Md. 2001)(quoting Davis v.
State, 451 A.2d 107, 111)).
192. Id. at 550 (citing Swenson v. Nickaboine, 793 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Minn. 2011); Gotkin v.
Weinberg, 66 A.2d 438, 439 (NJ 1949); McIllvaine Trucking, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd., 810
A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 2002); Jenkins v. Sal Chem. Co., 280 S.E.2d 243 (W.Va. 1981)).
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presence of an arbitration clause. Though not readily apparent, these
variations may be attributable to a few fundamental, but facially
inconsistent principles articulated by the Supreme Court. First, the
Court has stated that an agreement to arbitrate does not deprive a party
of substantive rights afforded by statute.193 However, the Court has also
stated that an arbitrator may issue a decision that is inimical to public
policy in an effort to effectuate the intent of the parties.194 Lastly, the
Supreme Court has stated emphatically that state legislation “cannot be
condemned because it curtails the power of the individual to
contract.”195
Reading these three principles collectively, it appears that more
weight should be given to the fact that an agreement to arbitrate does not
amount to a forfeiture of statutory rights, which in and of themselves
cannot be condemned for reducing the power of an individual to
contract. As such, an arbitrator’s power to issue a decision that is
inimical to statutory rights, insofar as workers’ compensation is
concerned, is better classified as permissive rather than final or binding,
and should therefore be used sparingly. Thus, in certain situations an
arbitrator’s decision should be reviewed de novo. With this in mind, this
Part will analyze each of the cases discussed in Part VI.
A. Tennessee Titans v. Matthews
In failing to vacate Arbitrator Sharpe’s award, the U.S. District Court
in the Southern District of California permitted Sharpe to engage in the
classic exercise of rendering a decision and then subsequently
attempting to find authority to support it. Additionally, the court itself
gave no reasoning for considering only the public policy vacatur factor
under § 301 of the LMRA and confusingly assumed without deciding
that the manifest disregard of the law basis for vacatur was available
under § 301.196 As demonstrated in Part VI(A) supra, the lengthy
discussion of Paragraph 26D of Matthews’ NFL Player Contract rather
than the NFL CBA should have alerted the court that the FAA was
applicable.
In finding as he did, Arbitrator Sharpe essentially held that the
193. Gilmer v. Interstate, 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
194. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981).
195. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. California, 294 U.S. 532, 543 (1935) (citing Hardware Dealers Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 157–58 (1931)).
196. See NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 2011 WL 31068, No. 10CV1671, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 5, 2011). Thus, we are left to assume that the award draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement, that the arbitrator is not dispensing his own brand of industrial justice, that the
arbitrator has not exceeded the boundaries of the issues submitted to him, and that the award was not
procured by fraud.
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Player’s agreement is to forgo all benefits except those available in
Tennessee and Texas, not to forgo the benefits altogether.197 This
holding is problematic and contrary to significant legal precedent.
Indeed, the employer in Alaska Packers was implicitly arguing that the
employees were forgoing all benefits except those available in Alaska,
not forgoing their benefits altogether.198
Furthermore, after
acknowledging “the possibility that a California tribunal may choose to
apply California law,”199 Sharpe required the parties to proceed under
Tennessee law and promised the issuance of a cease and desist order if
the California tribunals decided otherwise.200 Here, Sharpe noted that
although the “Player’s Contract does not control California’s application
of its own law; it does control the conduct of the parties.”201 As such,
Sharpe failed to consider the Full Faith and Credit Clause and thereby
deprived the California courts of the opportunity to consider and balance
the government interests of each state in reaching a decision.202 Thus,
Sharpe effectively prevented California from “enforc[ing] in its own
courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted.”203
Additionally, the district court’s acceptance of Sharpe’s decision
places a nearly insurmountable burden upon Matthews to demonstrate
that Sharpe manifestly disregarded the law. The court acknowledged
Matthews’ argument that under Alaska Packers California “‘had a
legitimate public interest in controlling and regulating this employer–
employee relationship’ and it would not violate due process to apply
§ 5000’s ban on contracts waiving California workers’
compensation.”204 The court also noted that Alaska Packers had been
favorably cited more than seventy years after being decided.205
Nonetheless, the court held that Matthews failed to “show the arbitrator
understood and correctly stated the law, but proceeded to disregard the
same,” despite Sharpe’s express discussion of “four Supreme Court
cases . . . a Ninth Circuit case . . . a professional football case . . . and a
California Workers’ Compensation Judge’s decision” in support of
Matthews’ position.206 In finding as it did, the district court confusingly
197. See Titans & Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116, at 6, 18.
198. See generally Alaska Packers Ass’n v. California, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
199. Titans & Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116, at 15.
200. Id. at 18.
201. Id. at 14.
202. See Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 542.
203. Id. at 547.
204. NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL Mgmt. Council, No. 10CV1671, 2011 WL 31068, at *4 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 5, 2011) (citing Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 539).
205. Id. at *5 (citing Bowen v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 73 Cal. App. 4th 15 (1999)).
206. Id. at *3 (citing Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007)); Titans &
Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116, at 9–10.
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held that Matthews had not outlined an explicit, well-defined, dominant
public policy,207 despite recognizing Supreme Court precedent that
found California to have a legitimate public interest at stake.208
The holding by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is similarly
confusing. As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit began by criticizing
Matthews’ failure to demonstrate significant contact with California.209
Later in the opinion, Matthews was criticized for making such an
argument without citation to the record.210 Subsequently, the Ninth
Circuit attempted to soften the blow by stating that an employee does
not have to show that he would prevail on his workers’ compensation
claim before a California tribunal, but only that his claim falls within the
scope of California’s workers’ compensation regime.211
The Ninth Circuit’s approach is problematic for two reasons. First,
the Ninth Circuit was asked to review the arbitration award, not
Matthews’ workers’ compensation filings. Second, the Ninth Circuit
failed to recognize the significance of Arbitrator Sharpe’s order that the
parties cease and desist from persuading the California tribunals to apply
California law.212 These problems will be discussed below.
The Ninth Circuit’s continued focus on Matthews’ insignificant
contacts with California is drastically different from the analysis
contained in the arbitration award and the district court opinion. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit opinion seems to ignore the arbitral award altogether.
As discussed in Parts V and VI supra, NFL arbitrators serve only as
contract readers and do not render workers’ compensation decisions.213
Thus, there was no reason for Matthews to provide Arbitrator Sharpe
with information regarding his injuries in California. Additionally, had
Matthews done so, Sharpe could not possibly determine, as the Ninth
Circuit seems to advocate, whether Matthews had alleged specific facts
to fall within the scope of California’s workers’ compensation regime
without performing at least some analysis of the California statute itself.
As such, the Ninth Circuit’s repeated criticism of Matthews’
submissions appears misguided. The lower court refused to engage in
an analysis of Matthews’ eligibility for workers’ compensation. Thus,
had Matthews attempted to demonstrate to the Ninth Circuit that he had
significant contacts with California, he likely would have been criticized
for raising an issue on appeal that had not been raised below.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

NFL Players, 2011 WL 31068, at * 5.
Id. at *4 (citing Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. 532).
See Matthews v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1113-14.
Id.
See Titans & Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116 at 15.
See Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Newson, 783 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (W.D. Pa. 2011).
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As for the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the cease and desist order, it
ignores the fact that workers’ compensation claims are informal and
need only identify the claimant, indicate that a compensable injury has
occurred, and convey the idea that compensation is expected.214
Similarly, this liberality extends to the amendment of pleadings and
generally includes amendments to correct defects such as vagueness,
omission of essential facts, or inaccuracy in the description of the
injury.215 Given the Titans’ decision to seek arbitration against
Matthews after he filed in California, the claim requirements were likely
satisfied. Additionally, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s criticism of
Matthews’ statement that he was injured at “‘various’ locations over 19
years,” it seems as though he could correct this statement on account of
its vagueness and omission of essential facts. Accordingly, by
upholding the arbitration award, the Ninth Circuit improperly deprived
Matthews of any real opportunity to demonstrate that he was otherwise
eligible for California benefits. In light of the inconsistencies just
discussed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals should have reviewed
Sharpe’s decision de novo. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit should have
found that Sharpe’s decision was contrary to well-defined public policy.
As such, the Ninth Circuit should have remanded the case and directed
the workers’ compensation tribunal to independently determine whether
California Labor Code § 5000 rightfully overrides Matthews’ contract
provision requiring the application of Tennessee law.216 Indeed, as
mentioned above, Arbitrator Sharpe himself recognized the possibility
that a California tribunal may choose to apply California law.217
B. Chicago Bears v. Haynes
Upon review, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals will likely share
District Judge Bucklo’s curiosity as to why the public policy of
California is relevant in this dispute.218 Equally confusing is the
players’ decision to file their claims in California when Illinois law
recognizes cumulative trauma.219
Notwithstanding this potential
confusion, the Seventh Circuit should remand the case to the California
214. LARSON, supra note 7, § 124.04.
215. Id. (citations omitted).
216. See NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL Mgmt. Council, No. 10CV1671, 2011 WL 31068, at *5–6
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011) (citing Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 539).
217. Titans & Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116, at 15.
218. See Chicago Bears v. Haynes, 816 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
219. See 26 ILLINOIS JURISPRUDENCE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 5:76 (stating “[i]n repetitive
trauma claims, the employee must meet the same standards of proof as any other claim. The employee
must establish (1) when the injury manifested itself and (2) that a causal connection exists between the
cumulative trauma and the eventual breakdown of the employee’s physical structure.”).
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workers’ compensation tribunals for the same reasons articulated in
Part VII(A). As such, the California workers’ compensation tribunals
should determine whether or not the players’ are entitled to California
workers’ compensation benefits.
The Seventh Circuit should also point out that Judge Bucklo’s
opinion contains a few troubling passages. First, the court implicitly
approved of Arbitrator Townley’s decision to give the Matthews
decision “preclusive effect,” despite the generally accepted premise that
arbitral awards have no value as precedent in future disputes220 as well
as the fact that the Matthews provision was found to be only a choice-oflaw clause.221 Secondly, assuming, arguendo, that the Matthews
decision could be used as precedent, footnote 5 of the Matthews decision
contains a specific example of what Arbitrator Sharpe determined to be
a “clearly drafted choice-of-forum clause”; however, that provision is
significantly different from those contained in the contracts signed by
the Bears players.222
Thus, when remanding the case, it would be wise for the Seventh
Circuit to emphasize the limited precedential value of arbitral awards as
well as to reiterate that the validity of choice-of-law and forum
provisions should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in accordance
with the appropriate state policy.
C. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa
While the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission gave
several reasons to support a finding for Tupa, the Commission could

220. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2012).
221. Chicago Bears, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
222. Compare Titans & Matthews Arbitration, supra note 116, at 12 (citing Addendum No. 3 of
the Player Contract between Khalid Abdullah and the Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., which reads, in part:
“Player further agrees that any claim, filing, petition, or cause of action in any way relating to workers’
compensation rights or benefits arising out of Player’s employment with the Club, including without
limitation the applicability or enforceability of this addendum shall be brought solely and exclusively
with the courts of Ohio, the Industrial Commission of Ohio, or such other Ohio tribunal that has
jurisdiction over the matter.”), with Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief in Support of Motion to Confirm
Arbitration Award, Chicago Bears v. Haynes, 816 F. Supp. 2d 534 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (No. 11CV02668)
(noting that the Players’ Employment Contracts with the Bears stated in relevant part “[s]hould any
dispute, claim or cause of action arise concerning rights or liabilities arising from the relationship
between the Player and the Club, the parties hereto agree that the law governing such dispute shall be
the law of the State of Illinois. Furthermore, the exclusive jurisdiction for resolving injury related
claims shall be the Illinois Industrial Commission of the State of Illinois, and in the case of Workers
Compensation claims the Illinois Workers Compensation Act shall govern.”). It is likely that the
significant difference between these two passages is the Bengals’ insertion of the “without limitation the
applicability or enforceability of this addendum . . .” language. Otherwise, the clauses are relatively
similar.
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have limited its findings to the fact that Tupa was injured in the course
of his employment within the state of Maryland and was thereby eligible
for workers’ compensation.223 As discussed above, because an in-state
injury can never be excluded from coverage,224 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland was wise to affirm the decision.225
Despite being decided in Maryland rather than California, the Tupa
case is an interesting one because it tends to support certain views that
are generally adopted by the NFL and by the NFLPA. First, the lower
court’s “purpose of employment” discussion is likely to assist most
teams whose home games are played in the same state as that which is
included in the forum selection clause.226 However, this discussion
would also be likely to support players having contracts similar to
Tupa’s (i.e., the choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions of the
players’ contracts provide for a state other than that in which they play
their home games).227 Second, both opinions suggest that cumulative
trauma leading to acute injury could result in an award of full
compensation within the state of the acute injury, which would certainly
favor the player.228 Third, and perhaps most importantly, both opinions
support Professor Larson’s (and the NFLPA’s) contention that any
agreement, even an NFL CBA or Player Contract, is void and
ineffective to the extent that it contravenes state policy.229 Lastly, the
lower court’s explanation that “the inquiry requires more than simply
tallying up the quantity of time the employee spends in each
jurisdiction” is quite malleable and could easily support the position of
223. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 682 (2011), cert. granted, 21 A.3d 1063 (Md.
June 17, 2011) (noting that “[i]t is undisputed that Tupa’s injury occurred while he was working at
FedEx Field in Landover”).
224. LARSON, supra note 7, § 143.01.
225. Furthermore, it is possible that Tupa would have been left without a remedy if the Maryland
court had declined to exercise jurisdiction. As discussed above, Virginia requires that “the place of
contract and the employer’s place of business are both within the state” and does not allow coverage at
all if “the contract is for services exclusively outside the state.” Id. As the court noted, the Redskins’
principal place of business, FedEx Field, is located in Landover, MD. Furthermore, because Virginia
does not have a professional football team, it would appear as though the purpose of Tupa’s
employment was to perform services exclusively outside of the state.
226. See Tupa, 14 A.3d at 683–84. The Redskins do not benefit in this regard as FedEx Field is
located just across the Virginia and Maryland border.
227. For example, like FedEx Field, which is located just across the Maryland border, the Edward
Jones Dome, which is the home of St. Louis Rams, is located just across the border from Missouri.
Similarly, both the New York Giants and New York Jets play at MetLife Stadium, which is located in
East Rutherford, New Jersey. It certainly seems possible that these teams may have signed, or may have
considered signing players to contracts with clauses similar to Tupa’s at some point.
228. See Tupa, 14 A.3d at 691 (noting that the “jury needed only to find that the accidental injury
contributed to the disability, not that it was the sole cause.”); see also Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund of Md.
v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 66 Cal. Comp. Cases 923 (Cal. App. 2001).
229. See id. (citing LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 143.07 (2010)). See
also Brache v. Tampa Bay Storm, 2010 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 339 (2010).
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either the NFL or the NFLPA.230
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As Article 41 of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement
illustrates, in the absence of further agreement between the NFL and
NFLPA or additional changes to state workers’ compensation statutes,
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses are likely to invite litigation
for quite some time.231 Specifically, Section 6 provides that “[t]he
parties shall retain the positions they held prior to this Agreement with
respect to all existing litigation and arbitration involving workers’
compensation issues . . . .”232 Additionally, of the twenty-two states that
currently host an NFL franchise, only three have workers’ compensation
statutes that specifically include professional athletes.233 As mentioned
above, the majority of state workers’ compensation statutes do not
expressly mention professional athletes. Thus, an athlete’s eligibility in
these states is ultimately determined by the courts.234 Accordingly, such
an approach appears to provide at least some incentive for players to file
in jurisdictions other than those which are listed in their Player
Contracts.
Conversely, the NFL and NFLPA have been able to address the
majority of their concerns regarding the offset provisions contained
within the Ohio and Missouri statutes, which serve to proportionally
limit the benefits already paid to injured athletes.235 Specifically, in
Article 41, Section 4 of the NFL CBA, the two sides agreed that NFL
clubs are unable to receive “dollar-for-dollar” credits for prior payments
and are instead entitled only to “time” credits.236
230. Tupa, 14 A.3d at 683.
231. See NFL CBA, supra note 1, at 179.
232. See id.
233. See Teams, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/teams; Modery, supra note 63, at 257. Here,
“specifically include” refers only to those states that expressly mention professional athletes within the
definition of “employee,” or include athletes by virtue of endorsement by the Attorney General. For
purposes of this Comment, state statutes containing off-set or election provisions will be discussed
separately. See id. (citing Applicability of Indus. Ins. Act to Certain Athletes, Op. Att’y Gen. Wash. 5
(Feb.
14,
1984),
available
at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/AGOOpinions/opinion.aspx?section=topic&id=7566).
234. See Modery, supra note 63, at 257.
235. See NFL CBA, supra note 1, at 176; Carlin & Fairman, supra note 69, at 111.
236. NFL CBA, supra note 1, at 176 (providing in relevant part “[n]o Club shall be entitled to
claim or receive any dollar-for-dollar credit or offset, other than as provided for in Article 3 of this
Agreement, for salary, benefits, or other compensation paid or payable to a player against any award or
settlement of workers’ compensation benefits, either pursuant to Paragraph 10 of the NFL Player
Contract or any provision of state law.”); see also id. at 176–77 (providing in relevant part “[a]ll Clubs
are instead entitled only to a ‘time’ credit or offset under Paragraph 10 of the NFL Player Contract or
state law, as set forth more specifically in Subparts (A)–(E) below. This ‘time’ credit or offset shall in
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In the meantime, in the absence of further agreement, the NFL would
be well-served to utilize its unique level of power and influence to
engage in political lobbying efforts to persuade states with current or
future NFL franchises to enact workers’ compensation statutes similar to
those which have already been enacted in the District of Columbia and
Kentucky.237 While the District of Columbia’s approach of establishing
an athlete’s “professional work life expectancy,” would tend to limit the
duration of payments, the Kentucky approach would go a step further by
completely excluding athletes of foreign states’ teams. This would
provide the NFL and its clubs with a highly-desired level of
predictability while increasing the enforceability of workers’
compensation choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses in the future.
Aside from the political lobbying itself, the sole cost to NFL and its
clubs would be that of self-insurance, a practice which some clubs have
been utilizing since 1968.238 Thus, political lobbying remains a viable,
yet unexplored alternative to workers’ compensation issues. Those
having doubts as to the NFL’s ability to impact political agendas may
want to consider the recent disputes regarding sports stadiums, eminent
domain, and public funding.239
In deciding where to kick off its political lobbying, the NFL should
follow the players’ lead and proceed directly to California. Indeed, the
legislative policies of California are responsible for the majority of the
recent workers’ compensation litigation between the NFL and NFLPA.
In doing so, the NFL’s political influence would be magnified by the
presence of the three NFL teams already within the state, as well as the

all cases be expressed or granted as a reduction in the number of weeks of a player’s workers’
compensation award or settlement that is attributable to the same period of weeks in which the player is
deemed entitled to salary payments described in this Part. The credit or offset shall be at the weekly rate
specified under the state workers’ compensation law in question. Because the period from the beginning
of the regular season to the end of the League Year (25 weeks) is approximately 1.5 times longer than
the seventeen week period over which players receive salary, the parties agree that, in calculating the
‘time’ credit or offset as set forth more particularly herein, the Club is entitled to a reduction of 1.5
weeks of a player’s workers’ compensation award or settlement for each week during the regular season
for which a player is awarded or executes a settlement agreement for workers’ compensation benefits
and for the same period of weeks is paid his full Paragraph 5 Salary”).
237. D.C. CODE § 32-1501 (17C) (2012) (“[T]he work life expectancy of a professional athlete is
determined separately for each professional sports franchise in the District by the Office of Workers’
Compensation through its rulemaking authority.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.670 (4) (West 2012).
238. See Brown v. Cincinnati Bengals, No. ADJ1220066 (Cal. W.C.A.B. Apr. 19, 2011) (on file
with author). Furthermore, under the Kentucky approach, teams are only required to secure insurance
within their state of domicile. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.670 (4) (West 2012).
239. See Minneapolis City Council Endorse Downtown Vikings Stadium Plan, SPORTS BUS.
DAILY
(Apr.
25,
2012),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/MorningBuzz/2012/04/25/Vikings.aspx (citing business and labor leaders ability to “put political muscle” behind
the stadium effort). See generally Michael Birch, Take Some Land for the Ball Game: Sports Stadiums,
Eminent Domain, and the Public Use Debate, 19 SPORTS LAW J. 173 (2012).
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real possibility of a fourth in the near future.240 Insofar as the actual
legislation is concerned, the NFL should push for an approach similar to
Kentucky’s, discussed above, which would result in the workers’
compensation law of foreign states providing the exclusive remedy for
athletes that are only temporarily employed within California.
Assuming, arguendo, that California’s historically liberal approach to
workers’ compensation would not support such a drastic change, an
alternative provision could limit the ability of athletes that are employed
by a team domiciled outside the forum from receiving cumulative
trauma benefits in California. In doing so, all of the parties involved
could avoid the seemingly frivolous arguments over whether or not a
few games played within California, over the course of the player’s
entire professional career, significantly contributed to his compensable
injuries.241 However, this approach would not likely have any effect on
California’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over acute injuries.
Lastly, regardless of whether the NFL chooses to engage political
lobbying, to negotiate a further agreement with the NFLPA, or to utilize
some other alternative not discussed herein, it is clear that the NFL
should not continue to operate solely under the “protection” of Article
41, Section 6 of the current CBA. Indeed, if the NFL fails to act, its
attorneys may begin to suffer from cumulative trauma themselves as a
result of the seemingly endless treks to the courthouse.

240. See Teams, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/teams. The NFL currently has clubs in Oakland,
San Diego, and San Francisco; however, in the author’s opinion, it is likely only a matter of time before
a club returns to Los Angeles.
241. See Brown v. Cincinnati Bengals, No. ADJ1220066 (Cal. W.C.A.B. Apr. 19, 2011) (on file
with author); Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., Comp. Cases 923 (Cal. App.
2001). Indeed, in the absence of an acute injury, such determinations are likely to be speculative at best.
Furthermore, these arguments ignore the difficulty involved in separating the trauma that is experienced
during a player’s professional career from that which occurred as a result of his participation in sandlot,
high school, and college football. Simply put, separating injuries of this sort is much more difficult than
the typical distinctions between work and home that are made in other contexts. See Haycraft v. Corhart
Refractories Co., 544 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1976) (apportioning compensation to employee who had
suffered two work-related and two non-work related back injuries during his 17 years of employment
which required him to perform heavy labor).
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